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THIRD-PARTY PRACTICE IN ADMIRALTY:
ANCILLARY JURISDICTION
by Barton R. Bentley
The ,United States Constitution states that -the judicial power of the United
States shall extend "to all Cases of admiralty an($ maritime Jurisdiction
.... "I The federal district courts have jurisdiction over admiralty and
maritime matters pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1333.2 Prior to 1966 federal ad-
miralty practice was governed by procedural rules separate from those per-
taining to civil procedure. The device of impleader governed by Admiralty
Rule 563 has long been one of the prominent characteristics of admiralty
practice. 4  Under Admiralty Rule 56 federal courts did not recognize the
concept of ancillary jurisdiction, 5 and required that a third-party claim have
an independent basis of admiralty jurisdiction. 6 In 1938 the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure introduced impleader into federal civil practice under rule
14.7  Civil impleader has adopted the concept of ancillary jurisdiction,8
1. U.S. CoNsT. art. HI, § 2. Admiralty jurisdiction depends on the maritime na-
ture of the event out of which the claim arises. Every tort, "if upon the high seas or
navigable waters, is of admiralty cognizance." The Plymouth, 70 U.S. (3 Wall.) 20,
36 (1865). For a more recent interpretation see Jet Aviation, Inc. v. City of Cleveland,
409 U.S. 249 (1972). Admiralty jurisdiction generally encompasses "all maritime con-
tracts, torts and injuries." De Lovio v. Boit, 7 F. Cas. 418, 442 (No. 3776) (C.C.D.
Mass. 1815). See generally G. GILMORE & C. BLACK, THE LAW OF ADMIRALTY 18-36
(1957) [hereinafter cited as GILMORE & BLACK]; Extension of Admiralty Jurisdiction
Act, 46 U.S.C. § 740 (1970).
2. 28 U.S.C. § 1333 (1970). Formerly provided for in the Judiciary Act of 1789,
§ 9, 1 Stat. 76. See Romero v. International Terminal Operating Co., 358 U.S. 354,
359-81 (1959).
3. ADMIRALTY R. 56, 254 U.S. 707 (1920), provided in part as follows:
In any suit, whether in rem or in personam, the claimant or respondent
(as the case may be) shall be entitled to bring in any other vessel or per-
son (individual or corporation) who may be partly of wholly liable either
to the libellant or to such claimant or respondent by way of remedy over,
contribution or otherwise, growing out of the same matter.
Admiralty impleader was originally embodied in ADMIRALTY R. 59 which dealt with col-
lisions. See 7A J. MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE IT 30, at 302-03 (1966) [hereinafter cited
as MOORE]. In 1921 the practice was recodified in ADMIRALTY R. 56. See generally
6 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE: CIVIL § 1465 (1971)
[hereinafter cited as WRIGHT & MILLER].
4. See 6 WRIGHT & MILLER § 1465, at 339.
5. Ancillary jurisdiction with respect to federal courts refers to the concept that
if the court has jurisdiction of the main action, it may, incident thereto, hear any supple-
mentary proceeding which is ancillary to or dependent on the main action, regardless
of any independent basis of federal jurisdiction. See Krippendorf v. Hyde, 110 U.S. 276
(1884); Freeman v. Howe, 65 U.S. (24 How.) 450 (1860); Iowa v. Union Asphalt &
Roadoils, Inc., 409 F.2d 1239 (8th Cir. 1969); Compton v. Jesup, 68 F. 263 (6th Cir.
1895). See generally C. WRIGHT, FEDERAL COURTS § 9, at 19-21 (1970) [hereinafter
cited as WRIGHT].
6. See Aktieselskabet Fido v. Lloyd Braziliero, 283 F. 62 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
260 U.S. 737 (1922); The Ada, 250 F. 194 (2d Cir. 1918); Central Leather Co. v. The
Goyaz, 281 F. 259 (S.D.N.Y. 1922), afl'd, 3 F.2d 553 (2d Cir. 1924), cert. denied, 247
U.S. 594 (1925). See also Capital Transp. Corp. v. Thelning, 167 F. Supp. 379
(E.D.S.C. 1958); Mangone v. Moore-McCormack Lines, Inc., 152 F. Supp. 848
(E.D.N.Y. 1957); Warner v. The Bear, 126 F. Supp. 529 (D. Alas. 1955); The S.S.
Samovar, 72 F. Supp. 574 (N.D. Cal. 1947); Rudy-Patrick Seed Co. v. Kokusai Kisen
Kabushiki Kaisha, 1 F. Supp. 266 (S.D.N.Y. 1932).
7. At the time of its adoption, rule 14 copied the admiralty impleader practice
which gave the defendant the right to implead someone who may be liable directly to
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which has proven to be a useful tool in promoting judicial efficiency with
respect to third-party practice.
In 1966 admiralty practice was merged into the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure. 9 'Rule 14(c) was added to the federal rules, and embodies the
substance of former Admiralty Rule 56.10 This procedural unification led
to some discussion of the possible end of the separate and distinct admiralty
jurisdiction, and the extension of ancillary jurisdiction over third-party claims
in admiralty under rule 14(c)," but this has not transpired. While the
policy reasons for extending the concept of ancillary jurisdiction to third-party
practice pertaining to maritime claims seem as strong as those behind the civil
rules, there are certain constitutional and historical barriers to such an ex-
tension. 12 The most authoritative discussion of the subject is McCann v.
Falgout Boat Co., 13 where it was held that rule 14(c) does not permit im-
pleader in a maritime suit without an independent basis of federal, and per-
haps admiralty, jurisdiction. 14 While this case still represents the prevailing
rule, 15 it has been attacked as contrary to the policy of the federal rules of
avoiding circuity of action and of having all causes arising from a common
nucleus of fact decided in one proceeding.' 6 Futhermore, subsequent de-
cisions by the Second and Fifth Circuit Courts of Appeals have cast some
doubt as to the continued efficacy of the McCann holding.' 7
This Comment explores the development of thi-rd-party practice in ad-
miralty, and, in particular, the rules behind the concept of ancillary jurisdic-
tion and the possible application of ancillary jurisdiction in admiralty im-
pleader. The primary thesis is that there is a reasonable solution which will
avoid the traditional logic that non-maritime third-party claims cannot be
within the ancillary jurisdiction of a federal court sitting in admiralty.
the original plaintiff. This provision was removed from rule 14 in 1948 and later re-
enacted in 1966 as FED. R. Civ. P. 14(c). See 6 WRIGHT & MILLER § 1465, at 342
n.94.
8. Olson v. United States, 38 F.R.D. 489 (D. Neb. 1965); Union Bank & Trust
Co. v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 38 F.R.D. 486 (D. Neb. 1965); Heintz & Co.
v. Provident Tradesmens Bank & Trust Co., 30 F.R.D. 171 (E.D. Pa. 1962). See gener-
ally WRIGHT § 76, at 332-38. See also note 5 supra.
9. Drawn under the authority of 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (1970). See generally Colby,
Admiralty Unification, 54 GEo. L.J. 1258 (1966).
10. 7A MOORE .54[31, at 396. FED. R. Civ. P. 14(c) in part provides:
When a plaintiff asserts an admiralty or maritime claim within the mean-
ing of Rule 9(h), the defendant or claimant, as a third-party plaintiff, may
bring in a third-party defendant who may be wholly or partly liable, ei-
ther to the plaintiff or to the third-party plaintiff, by way of remedy over,
contribution, or otherwise on account of the same transaction, occurrence,
or series of transactions or occurrences. In such a case the third-party
plaintiff may also demand judgment against the third-party defendant in
favor of the plaintiff ....
11. See Fiddler, The Admiralty Practice in Montana and All That, 17 MAINE L.
REV. 15 (1965). See also Colby, supra note 9.
12. See generally Landers, By Sleight of Rule: Admiralty Unification and Ancil-
lary and Pendent Jurisdiction, 51 TEXAS L. REv. 50 (1972).
13. 44 F.R.D. 34 (S.D. Tex. 1968).
14. Id. at 41.
15. Bernard v. United States Lines Inc., 475 F.2d 1134 (4th Cir. 1973); Stinson
v. S.S. Kenneth McKay, 360 F. Supp. 674 (S.D. Tex. 1973). See also note 6 supra.
16. See Landers, supra note 12, at 67-69; Comment, Pendent Jurisdiction in Ad-
miralty, 1973 Wis. L. REv. 594, 602-03.
17. Leather's Best, Inc. v. S.S. Mormaclynx, 451 F.2d 800 (2d Cir. 1971); Watz
v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 431 F.2d 100 (5th Cir. 1970).
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I. THIRD-PARTY PRACTICE IN ADMIRALTY
Prior to 1966 Admiralty Rule 5618 provided that in any suit a claimant
or respondent could implead any person or vessel who may be liable either
to the libellant or to the claimant or respondent, if the liability arose out of
the same matter as the principal claim.") The distinctive feature of the rule
is found in the provision permitting the defendant to implead not only some-
one who may be liable to him for the plaintiff's claim, but also someone who
may be directly liable to the plaintiff, such as joint, alternate, or successive
tortfeasors. 20 This procedure is especially desirable in admiralty where most
losses are insured, often by different underwriters, and an arbitrary choice
by the plaintiff of the particular party to bear the loss would not be equi-
table.2 1
A. The Procedural Merger of 1966
In 1966 admiralty practice was brought under the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure 22 in hopes of extending the benefits of modern procedural
advantages to admiralty cases. 23 The draftsmen decided, however, 'that cer-
tain maritime procedures such as the distinctive impleader practice should be
retained.24 To accomplish this, rule 14(c), which represents the substance
of the admiralty impleader practice existing under Admiralty Rule 56,25 was
added to the federal rules. 26 Rule 14(c) provides that the defendant may
implead a party "who may be wholly or partly liable, either to the plaintiff
18. ADMIRALTY R. 56, 254 U.S. 707 (1920).
19. ADMIRALTY R. 56; see note 3 supra. See also 7A MOORE .30, at 301-02.
20. See Note of the Advisory Committee on the 1966 Amendment to rule 14, 28
U.S.C. APPENDIX-Rules of Civil Procedure 7753 (1970). An interesting point is
raised by the overlap of rules 14(a) and 14(c). Rule 14(a) permits the defendant to
implead a party obligated to indemnify him for the plaintiff's claim against the defend-
ant. Rule 14(c) authorizes the defendant to implead another party when there may be
an indemnity obligation, or where the third party may be liable directly to the plaintiff.
The doctrine of ancillary jurisdiction would apply to an indemnity claim under rule
14(a). Thus the defendant in an admiralty suit has the choice of utilizing either rule
14(a) or rule 14(c) as a means of seeking indemnity against a third party. See Saus
v. Delta Concrete Co., 368 F. Supp. 297 (W.D. Pa. 1973). See also 6 WRIGHT & MiL-
LER § 1465, at 346-47.
21. See Colby, supra note 9, at 1272. This practice was first permitted in The Hud-
son, 15 F. 162 (S.D.N.Y. 1883), where the court noted several factors which make im-
pleader particularly desirable in admiralty cases, including: the possibility of inconsis-
tent results in separate actions, the alternative of possibly conducting multiple actions
based on the same facts, and the possibility of the third party disappearing if jurisdiction
and control over him (or it) were not established immediately. Id. at 168-70. See also
British Transp. Comm'n v. United States, 354 U.S. 129 (1957); Ohio River Co. v. Con-
tinental Grain Co., 352 F. Supp. 505 (N.D. Ill. 1972); Bilkay Holding Corp. v. Consoli-
dated Iron & Metal Co., 330 F. Supp. 1313 (S.D.N.Y. 1971); Van Nood v. Federal
Barge Lines Inc., 282 F. Supp. 890 (E.D. La. 1968); Monarch Indus. Corp. v. Ameri-
can Motorists Ins. Co., 276 F. Supp. 972 (E.D.N.Y. 1967).
22. See note 9 supra.
23. See Colby, supra note 9.
24. See Notes of the Advisory Committee on the 1966 Amendment to Rule 14, su-
pra note 20. The reason for this was primarily the historical tradition behind ADMIR-
ALTY R. 56. See note 21 supra.
25. Notes of the Advisory Committee on the 1966 Amendment to Rule 14, supra
note 20. See generally 7A MOORE .54131, at 396; 6 WRIGHT & MILLER § 1465, at
342.




or to the third-party plaintiff .... ,,27 The rule thus preserves the defend-
ant's right to demand judgment in favor of the plaintiff directly against the
third-party defendant as was traditionally allowed by Admiralty Rule 56,28
and also permits a claimant to become a third-party plaintiff. 29
Under rule 9(h) of the federal rules the plaintiff may invoke admiralty
jurisdiction, and therefore rule 14 (c), when the suit is cognizable in admir-
alty and -when there is an alternative basis for federal subject matter jurisdic-
tion by specifically identifying the complaint as one in admiralty.30 When
the only basis for federal jurisdiction is admiralty jurisdiction, rule 14(c) is
invoked automatically. 31
The 1966 amendments to rule 14(a) added the concluding sentence to
that rule, which indicates that the -third-party complaint, if within the admir-
alty and maritime jurisdiction, may be brought in rem against a vessel, cargo,
or other property which is subject to maritime arrest.3 2 If the plaintiff's com-
plaint is not identified as one in admiralty under rule 9(h), and the last sen-
tence of rule 14(a) is inapplicable due to the in personam nature of the ac-
tion, the defendant may avail himself of the special admiralty provisions only
by following the general impleader practice under rule 14(c), or by insti-
tuting a separate admiralty suit.33 In either case, the defendant must desig-
nate his claim as one in admiralty pursuant -to rule 9(h).3 4 Under rule
14(c) the liability of the third-party defendant must arise out of "the same
transaction, occurrence, or series of transactions or occurrences" 35 as the
original claim. This language is substantially the same as the language of
Admiralty Rule 56 which stated that the third-party claim must be one
"growing out of the same matter" as the principal claim. 36'
The fact that an action is cognizable in admiralty does not necessarily
mean -that it may not be brought at "law." T37 The common law theory of
concurrent admiralty and civil jurisdiction was incorporated into the Judiciary
27. FED. R. Civ. P. 14(c); see note 10 supra.
28. This is different from rule 14(a) which does not provide for direct impleader
vis-a-vis the plaintiff and the third-party defendant. FED. R. Civ. P. 14(a).
29. As to who may be a third-party plaintiff under rule 14(c), see Petition of Klar-
man, 270 F. Supp. 1001 (D. Conn. 1967), where the court permitted impleader in a
limitation of liability proceeding.
30. FED. R. Civ. P. 9(h), in part provides:
A pleading . . . setting forth a claim . . . within the admiralty and mari-
time jurisdiction that is also within the jurisdiction of the district court on
some other ground may contain a statement identifying the claim as an
admiralty or maritime claim for the purposes of Rules 14(c), 38(e), 82,
and the Supplemental Rules for Certain Admiralty and Maritime Claims.
If the claim is cognizable only in admiralty, it is an admiralty or mari-
time claim for those purposes whether so identified or not.
31. FED. R. Civ. P. 9(h); see Madruga v. Superior Court, 346 U.S. 556 (1954).
See generally 6 WRIGHT & MILLER § 1465, at 343.
32. FED. R. Civ. P. 14(a).
33. See generally 6 WRIGrr & MILLER § 1465, at 343.
34. See Banks v. Hanover Steamship Corp., 43 F.R.D. 374, 376-77 (D. Md. 1967).
35. FED. R. Civ. P. 14(c).
36. See note 3 supra.
37. The plaintiff has a right to his common law remedy if one exists. See Leon
v. Glaceran, 78 U.S. (11 Wall.) 185 (1870). See also 28 U.S.C. § 1333 (1970). This
rule developed because the English common law courts established their jurisdiction con-
currently with that of the English admiralty courts. See generally GILMORE & BLACK
33-36; 7A MOORE .59[3], at 417.
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Act of 1789, which granted admiralty jurisdiction to the federal courts "sav-
ing to suitors, in all cases, the right of a common law remedy, where the com-
mon law is competent to give it . . . . , Thus, if the plaintiff seeks an in
personam judgment for damages where the common law is competent to give
the remedy, the plaintiff has his choice of either invoking admiralty jurisdic-
tion through the use of rule 9(h), or seeking his common law remedy.39 An
example of such a situation would be a case where a longshoreman may as-
sert his claim for personal injuries suffered by reason of unseaworthiness in
a suit involving admiralty jurisdiction by identifying the claim as one in ad-
miralty under rule 9(h), or he may sue at "law" for negligence. 40
B. The Consequences of the Plaintiff's Choice
The importance of the plaintiff's choice lies in the fact that there is no
constitutional -right of jury trial in admiralty. 41 The 1966 amendments to
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure added subdivision ,(e) to rule 38, pro-
viding that "[t]hese rules shall not be construed to create a right to trial by
jury of the issues in an admiralty or maritime claim within the meaning of
Rule 9(h). '' 42 Thus, if the plaintiff designates his claim as one in admiralty,
it is one properly cognizable in admiralty, 43 and it satisfies federal jurisdic-
tional requirements, there will be no jury trial of the issues. If the plaintiff
sues at law, there is a right of jury trial guaranteed by the seventh amend-
ment.44  The decision of whether or not to invoke admiralty jurisdiction is
often based on litigation strategy pertaining to -the relative preference of a
jury trial as opposed ,to a trial by the court.43
38. Judiciary Act of 1789, § 9, 1 Stat. 76, 77. The language currently reads:
"The district courts shall have original jurisdiction ... of: (1) Any civil case of admir-
alty or maritime jurisdiction, saving to suitors in all cases all other remedies to which
they are otherwise entitled." 28 U.S.C. § 1333 (1970).
39. Rounds v. Cloverport Foundry & Mach. Co., 237 U.S. 303 (1915); Knapp, Stout
& Co. v. McCaffrey, 177 U.S. 638 (1900). This does not apply to the admiralty right
to proceed in rem because such a proceeding is not a common law remedy. The Hine
v. Trevor, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 555 (1866).
40. See Atlantic & Gulf Stevedores, Inc. v. Ellerman Lines Ltd., 369 U.S. 355(1962); Gyorfi v. Partrederiet Atomena, 58 F.R.D. 112 (N.D. Ohio 1973). Another
example involves an injured seaman's claim against his employer under the Merchant
Marine Act of 1920, 46 U.S.C. §§ 861-89 (1970) (the Jones Act); (1) because of un-
seaworthiness; and (2) for maintenance and cure. He may bring this action in a state
court and enjoy a jury trial on all the issues. See FED. R. Civ. P. 9(h). His suit in
state court under the Jones Act is not removable. Or, he may choose to sue in federal
court and invoke admiralty jurisdiction. If he does not invoke admiralty jurisdiction,
the federal court would have jurisdiction at "law" and this includes a right of jury trial
under the Jones Act. See Fitzgerald v. United States Lines Co., 374 U.S. 16 (1963);
Haskins v. Point Towing Co., 395 F.2d 737 (3d Cir. 1968); Saus v. Delta Concrete Co.,
368 F. Supp. 297 (W.D. Pa. 1973). See generally 7A MOORE .59[3], at 418-19.
41. The reason for this is that the seventh amendment merely preserves the right
of jury trial in suits at common law. U.S. CONST. amend. VII; see Fitzgerald v. United
States Lines Co., 374 U.S. 16 (1963); Cateora v. British Atlantic Assur. Ltd., 282 F.
Supp. 167 (S.D. Tex. 1968). See generally Comment, supra note 16, at 605-08.
42. FED. R. Civ. P. 38(e).
43. A suit is properly cognizable in admiralty by virtue of the maritime nature of
the claim. See note 1 supra.
44. U.S. CONST. amend. VII; see Atlantic & Gulf Stevedores, Inc. v. Ellerman Lines,
Ltd., 369 U.S. 355 (1962), where a jury trial was extended to the shipowner's third-
party claim against the stevedoring company.
45. See generally 7A MOORE 11 .59[3], at 417-20.
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While there is no constitutional right of jury trial in admiralty cases, no
constitutional impediment would preclude trial by jury in admiralty.46  There
is no constitutional right to a non-jury trial in admiralty. 47  With respect
to third-party practice in admiralty, there is likewise no constitutional right
to a jury trial on the issues raised by a third-party claim. 48  However, as
will be developed later, problems arise in this con-text when the defendant
in an admiralty case attempts to implead someone based on a non-maritime
claim.
II. ANCILLARY JURISDICTION
A. Ancillary Jurisdiction with Respect to Civil Impleader4a
Federal courts have long recognized the doctrine of ancillary jurisdiction."
Under this concept, if the court has jurisdiction over the main action, it may,
as an incident to that action, take jurisdiction over other matters raised by
the case without an independent basis of federal jurisdiction."' Thus, a fed-
eral court may hear proceedings which are ancillary to the principal action
regardless of the factors which normally control jurisdictionA2
The advent of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in 1938 sanctioned
broadened procedures for joinder, including impleader. 3 However, rule 82
explicitly stated that the rules were not intended to expand the ordinary prin-
46. Fitzgerald v. United States Lines Co., 374 U.S. 16 (1963); Atlantic & Gulf
Stevedores, Inc. v. Ellerman Lines, Ltd., 369 U.S. 355 (1962). See generally Landers,
supra note 12, at 66. Jury trials have been allowed in maritime cases arising on the
Great Lakes since 1845 pursuant to the express authorization of the Great Lakes Act,
5 Stat. 726 (1845), as amended, 28 US.C. § 1873 (1970). See also The Genesee Chief
v. Fitzhugh, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 443 (1851), where the constitutionality of the Great
Lakes Act was upheld.
47. Note however, that rules 38 and 39 control the demand and waiver of jury trial,
and if the plaintiff properly invokes admiralty jurisdiction, there is no right of jury trial.
See note 41 supra, See also Notes of the Advisory Committee on the 1966 Amendment
to Rule 9(h) which states that "[i]t is no part of the purpose of unification to inject
a right to jury trial into those admiralty cases in which that right is not provided by
statute." 28 U.S.C. APPENDIx-Rules of Civil Procedure 7745 (1970).
48. See Sanchez v. Loyd W. Richardson Constr. Corp., 56 F.R.D. 472, 473 (S.D.
Tex. 1972), where the court stated that "when a third-party defendant 'who may be
wholly or partly' liable is brought into an admiralty . . . case by virtue of Rule 14(c)
.... he is not entitled to a jury trial." See also Cantey v. Flensburger Dampfercom-
pagnie Harald Schuldt & Co., 55 F.R.D. 127 (E.D.N.C. 1971).
49. This Comment will limit its discussion as much as possible to the concept of
ancillary jurisdiction with respect to third-party practice in admiralty. The related doc-
trine of pendent jurisdiction will not be independently examined. Many authors have
ignored the distinction entirely and have treated the two concepts as synonymous. See
Comment, supra note 16; Note, Pendent Jurisdiction in Admiralty, 18 WAYNE L. REv.
1211 (1972). There is, however, a distinction between the two concepts. Ancillary ju-
risdiction deals with the situation in which additional parties are added to a case or in
which existing parties assert new claims among themselves. Pendent jurisdiction per-
tains to joinder by the plaintiff of multiple claims, one of which is within federal juris-
diction, while others lack independent federal jurisdictional grounds. See I W. BARRON
& A. HOLTZOFF, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 23, at 97 (C. Wright ed. 1960).
50. Moore v. New York Cotton Exch., 270 U.S. 593 (1926); Freeman v. Howe,
65 U.S. (24 How.) 450 (1860). See also Note, The Ancillary Concept and the Federal
Rules, 64 HARv. L. REv. 968 (1951).
51. Krippendorf v. Hyde, 110 U.S. 276 (1884); James Talcott, Inc. v. Allahabad
Bank, Ltd., 444 F.2d 451 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 940 (1971); Iowa v. Union
Asphalt & Roadoils, Inc., 409 F.2d 1239 (8th Cir. 1969).
52. See notes 5, 8 supra.
53. See WRIGHT §§ 70-80, at 293-354.
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ciples of jurisdiction; 54 yet, strict adherence to traditional rules of jurisdiction
would have severely limited the effectiveness of the broadened joinder and
impleader provisions. 55 Two approaches were utilized by federal courts to
escape the grasp of the prohibition contained in rule 82. One theory which
has been utilized with respect to impleader is the view that ancillary jurisdic-
tion over rule 14 third-party claims is not an extension of jurisdiction, but
merely a recognition that rule 14 sanctions the procedure of impleader which
rests conceptually upon the idea that a "claim" is comprised of a core of facts
which give rise to rights which flow both to and from a defendant.5 6 Under
this view a federal court with jurisdiction of the principal claim necessarily
has ancillary jurisdiction over -other matters flowing from that claim.
The other theory found authority in pre-federal rules cases for the doctrine
of ancillary jurisdiction, and thus reasoned that there was in fact no expan-
sion of jurisdiction inconsistent with rule 82.57  By utilizing these theories
federal courts have been able to adopt a concept of ancillary jurisdiction
which has permitted the broad provisions in the rules pertaining to joinder
and impleader to be reconciled with federal jurisdictional requirements.
Under federal civil practice impleader falls within the ambit of the doctrine
of :ancillary jurisdiction.58  If there is a basis for federal jurisdiction between
the original parties, no independent grounds for federal jurisdiction are re-
quired to implead a third party under rule 14(a).5 9  This allows federal
courts in impleader actions to effectuate the policy of avoiding circuity of ac-
tion and of trying an entire case arising from one set of facts in one proceed-
ing.60
B. Ancillary Jurisdiction with Respect to Admiralty Impleader
Prior to 1966
Under Admiralty Rule 56 the doctrine of ancillary jurisdiction over non-
maritime third-party claims was not recognized. 6' This non-recognition can
be traced to The Ada,62 a case involving a contract which was partly mar-
54. FED. R. Civ. P. 82.
55. See WRIGHT § 76, at 336.
56. Dery v. Wyer, 265 F.2d 804 (2d Cir. 1959).
57. Brandt v. Olson, 179 F. Supp. 363 (N.D. Iowa 1959). See Fraser, Ancillary
Jurisdiction and the Joinder of Claims in the Federal Courts, 33 F.R.D. 27 (1963); cases
cited note 50 supra.
58. Pennsylvania R.R. v. Erie Avenue Warehouse Co., 302 F.2d 843 (3d Cir.
1962); Dery v. Wyer, 265 F.2d 804, 806-07 (2d Cir. 1959).
59. H.L. Peterson Co. v. Applewhite, 383 F.2d 430, 433 (5th Cir. 1967); United
States v. Edward R. Marden Corp., 294 F. Supp. 21 (D.R.I. 1968); Thompson v. United
Artists Theatre Circuit, Inc., 43 F.R.D. 197 (S.D.N.Y. 1967). This rule is justified on
the theory that the word "claim" encompasses one aggregate core of facts, and the court,
having jurisdiction over the main action, has ancillary jurisdiction over third-party
claims resting on the same core of facts. See Dery v. Wyer, 265 F.2d 804 (2d Cir.
1959).
60. See cases cited note 58 supra.
61. David Crystal, Inc. v. Cunard S.S. Co., 223 F. Supp. 273 (S.D.N.Y. 1963), aff'd
on other grounds, 339 F.2d 295 (2d Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 380 U.S. 976 (1965); see
note 6 supra.
62. 250 F. 194 (2d Cir. 1918). The issue was actually in some doubt prior to The
Ada. In Evans v. New York & P.S.S. Co., 163 F. 405 (S.D.N.Y. 1906), the court
treated the right to assert a non-maritime cross-claim against a co-defendant as the
equivalent of a non-maritime third-party claim, and allowed an extension of ancillary
1974] COMMENTS 1027
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time and partly non-maritime, where it was held that the jurisdiction of fed-
eral courts sitting in admiralty was limited exclusively to maritime matters. 63
This view was bolstered in Central Leather Co. v. The Goyaz,6 4 where the
court stated that construing rule 56 so as to permit third-party impleader of
non-marltime claims would be "beyond the power of the court, because it
would not be a regulation of practice, but would extend the jurisdiction of
the District Court to include nonmaritime subjects." 5
The question was again considered in A ktieselskabet Fido v. Lloyd Brazili-
ero, 66 where the owners of a vessel sued its charterers who, in turn, im-
pleaded a third party on a breach of warranty theory. The court held that
the charterers were not liable, and, relying heavily on The Goyaz, found that
there was no jurisdiction over the third-party claim. 67 The court reasoned
that rule 56 had been derived from former Admiralty Rule 59, and that rule
56 must be read with the maritime limitation which was present in rule 59.68
The court further argued that the power of the Supreme Court to set forth
rules of procedure did not include the power to expand the limitations of
admiralty jurisdiction.6 9 Finally, the court concluded that any such extension
of jurisdiction could lead to violations of the third-party defendant's right of
jury trial on the non-maritime legal issues.70  This very line of reasoning has
subsequently become the basis of post-unification decisions holding that there
may be no impleader of non-maritime third-party claims in an admiralty
suit.7 1
It has also been concluded that extension of ancillary jurisdiction over non-
maritime third-party claims in an admiralty suit might work to deprive the
impleaded party of his right of jury trial. 7 2 It is certainly true that an admir-
alty court could not constitutionally deprive a third-party defendant of his
right to a jury determination of the non-maritime legal issues raised by a
third-party claim. 73  It is not clear, however, that extension of the doctrine
of ancillary jurisdiction would necessarily have this result. In examining
jurisdiction over the non-maritime claim. This holding was based on the policies behind
ADMIRALTY R. 59, the general policy of admiralty impleader as expressed in The Hud-
son, 15 F. 162 (S.D.N.Y. 1883), and the policy favoring judicial economy in having
the entire action settled in one lawsuit. However, the holding in Evans was contrary
to an earlier decision, Salisbury v. Seventy Thousand Feet of Lumber, 68 F. 916(S.D.N.Y. 1895), which had rejected a similar argument.
63. 250 F. 194, 195 (2d Cir. 1918).
64. 281 F. 259 (S.D.N.Y. 1922), af 'd, 3 F.2d 553 (2d Cir. 1924), cert. denied,
267 U.S. 594 (1925).
65. 281 F. at 261.
66. 283 F. 62 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 260 U.S. 737 (1922).
67. Id. at 72-74.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 73-74.
70. Id. at 74.
71. Stinson v. S.S. Kenneth McKay, 360 F. Supp. 674 (S.D. Tex. 1973); McCann
v. Falgout Boat Co., 44 F.R.D. 34 (S.D. Tex. 1968); Capital Transp. Corp. v. Thelning,
167 F. Supp. 379 (E.D.S.C. 1958); Mangone v. Moore-McCormack Lines, Inc., 152 F.
Supp. 848 (E.D.N.Y. 1957); Warner v. The Bear, 126 F. Supp. 529 (D. Alas. 1955);
The S.S. Samovar, 72 F. Supp. 574 (N.D. Cal. 1947).
72. See Texas Menhaden Co. v. Palermo, 329 F.2d 579 (5th Cir. 1964).
73. The seventh amendment would emphatically bar any denial of the right of jury
trial. U.S. CONST. amend. VII; see Korbut v. Keystone Shipping Co., 380 F.2d 352 (5th
Cir. 1967); Thermo-Stitch, Inc. v. Chemi-Cord Processing Corp., 294 F.2d 486 (5th Cir.
1961).
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analogous decisions in other areas it seems clear that the third-party defend-
ant's right to a jury trial on legal issues raised by a third-par-ty claim must
be preserved.74  Even though there is no constitutional right to a jury trial
in admiralty, there is likewise no constitutional right of parties in an admi-
ralty suit to a non-jury trial.75  Thus, it does not follow that the extension
of ancillary jurisdiction over a non-maritime third-party claim must neces-
sarily work to deprive the third-party defendant of his right of jury trial on
the legal issues. 76 A part-jury trial could be used to preserve the right of
jury trial as to the legal issues.
C. Ancillary Jurisdiction with Respect to Rule 14(c) Claims:
The Post-Unification Problem
While the rules with respect to ancillary jurisdiction over third-party claims
in admiralty had been fairly well settled under Admiralty Rule 56, 77 the
unification of the civil and admiralty rules raised the opportunity for chal-
lenging the accepted view that there may be no impleader of a non-maritime
third-party claim in an admiralty suit. The first case to raise this issue after
the unification was McCann v. Falgout Boat Co.,78 where the court held:
[T]here can be no non-maritime impleader in an action where the juris-
diction of the district court is based exclusively upon the maritime na-
ture of ,the plaintiff's claim for relief-absent independent [federal], and
perhaps admiralty, jurisdiction over the third party or the subject matter
of the third-party complaint.79
In McCann the plaintiff was a seaman who brought suit in admiralty
against the operator of the vessel to recover damages from an injury caused
by negligence and the unseaworthiness of the ship. The defendant ship
operator impleaded the doctor who had attended the plaintiff's hand on the
theory that the doctor had contributed to the injury.80  The court regarded
-the claim against the doctor as entirely separate from that of the seaman
against the ship operator, and thus non-maritime in nature.81  Judge Noel
74. See Beacon Theatres, Inc. v. Westover, 359 U.S. 500 (1959), where the Supreme
Court held that a jury trial must be made available for the legal issues raised by a com-
pulsory counterclaim in spite of the fact that the principal suit was in equity for a non-jury remedy. See also Dairy Queen, Inc. v. Wood, 369 U.S. 469 (1962).
75. See notes 46, 47 supra and accompanying text.
76. See notes 127-35 infra and accompanying text. See also Comment, supra note
16, at 605-08; 6 WRIGHT & MILLER § 1465, at 350-52.
77. See note 6 supra and accompanying text.
78. 44 F.R.D. 34 (S.D. Tex. 1968).
79. Id. at 41. The McCann opinion left unanswered the question of whether juris-
diction would have been denied if the claim had been brought solely for indemnity. An
indemnity claim can fall within both rule 14(a) and rule 14(c). However, under rule
14(a) the impleaded claim can be within the ancillary jurisdiction of a federal court.
See Consolidated Cork Corp. v. Jugoslavenska Linijska Plovidba, 318 F. Supp. 1209
(S.D.N.Y. 1970), where the court held that there was no admiralty jurisdiction- over the
plaintiff's direct claim against the third party, but admiralty jurisdiction was proper if
treated as a third-party claim for indemnity. The ancillary jurisdiction concept would
apply to any rule 14(a) indemnity claim. See note 5 supra.
80. The third-party claim against the doctor was based alternatively on the theory
that the doctor was directly liable to the plaintiff, or was obligated to indemnify the
defendant for the plaintiff's claim against him. Id. at 36.
81. Id. at 41-42.
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for the Southern District of Texas stated that unification did not extend the
liberal ancillary jurisdiction rules permitted under civil impleader to admi-
ralty. To the contrary, he argued persuasively that unification specifically
preserved the traditional admiralty approach to the question of ancillary
jurisdiction over non-maritime third-party claims.82  He concluded that rule
14(c) was based on Admiralty Rule 56, which had not allowed such ancil-
lary jurisdiction, 83 and reasoned that the rule of construction that the "prior
interpretation [of a statute] must be deemed to have received legislative
approval by the reenactment of 'the statutory provision without material
change"' 84 should apply equally to the construction of a federal rule. Thus,
rule 14(c) must be read in light of the jurisdictional limitations which accom-
panied Admiralty Rule 56. In support of this argument it was noted that
the advisory committee's note to rule 14(c) states that "[r]etention of the
admiralty practice in those cases that will be counter-parts of a suit in admi-
ralty is clearly desirable." 8 5 Judge Noel further reasoned that permitting im-
pleader of a non-maritime claim in an admiralty suit "would be an extension
of the court's jurisdiction which had not been permitted under Admiralty
Rule 56;"86 such an extension would be contrary to Federal Rule 82 which
explicitly states that "[tihese rules shall not be construed to extend or limit
the jurisdiction of the United States district courts."8' 7
Judge Noel also argued that extension of the doctrine of ancillary jurisdic-
tion so as to permit impleader of a non-maritime claim in an admiralty suit
could work to deprive the third-party defendant of his right of jury trial.88
This could occur because there is no right of jury trial in admiralty, 9 and
rule 38(e) states that the rules shall not be interpreted so as to create a right
of jury trial in a maritime case.90 Judge Noel reasoned that the possible
denial of the right of jury trial would raise a serious constitutional issue; and
that, when possible, the rules should be construed in a manner which avoids
constitutional questions.91
The logic of McCann is in accord with the pre-unification cases, particu-
larly Aktieselskabat Fido.92  Yet, federal courts have subsequently ques-
tioned the McCann holding in certain instances. In Watz v. Zapata OfI-
Shore Co.9 3 Watz asserted an admiralty claim under rule 9(h) against
82. Id. at 40-41.
83. Id. at 40.
84. Id. See generally United States v. Dakota-Montana Oil Co., 288 U.S. 459
(1933).
85. 44 F.R.D. at 40-41; see Notes of the Advisory Committee on the 1966 Amend-
ment to Rule 14, supra note 20.
86. 44 F.R.D. at 41.
87. FED. R. Civ. P. 82. Judge Noel stated that "[i]f a defendant were allowed to
implead a party under Rule 14(c) who might be liable to the original plaintiff but whose
alleged obligation is non-maritime in character and over whom the court has no inde-
pendent jurisdiction, the result would be to permit an extension of the federal court's
jurisdiction contrary to the mandate of Rule 82. . . ." 44 F.R.D. at 41.
88. 44 F.R.D. at 41.
89. See note 41 supra.
90. 44 F.R.D. at 44; see FED. R. Civ. P. 38(e).
91. 44 F.R.D. at 44; see Schneider v. Smith, 390 U.S. 17 (1968); United States v.
Harriss, 347 U.S. 612 (1954).
92. See notes 66-71 supra and accompanying text.
93. 431 F.2d 100 (5th Cir. 1970).
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Zapata, who impleaded third-party defendant Eaton Yale and Towne, Inc.
Eaton then brought in Campbell Chain Company on a fourth-party com-
plaint. Campbell challenged jurisdiction on the theory that the fourth-party
complaint was based on negligence and breach of implied warranty arising
out of a Pennsylvania sale not within the admiralty jurisdiction of the court. 9 4
Campbell's contention was grounded on the theory that rule 14(c) carried
forward the requirement of Admiralty Rule 56 that an impleader action be
maritime in nature and that ancillary jurisdiction may not be applied. 9 The
Fifth Circuit stated that Campbell's liability, if proved, would be such as to
arise out of the same occurrence as the original admiralty claim: the injury
to Watz on board the vessel.9 6 The court upheld jurisdiction over the fourth-
party complaint stating:
Without expressing any view on the correctness of a decision such as
McCann, we note that the third-party complaint there was distinctly
not maritime. .... The same reasoning that led us to conclude that
admiralty jurisdiction existed over Watz's claim against Eaton sus-
tains admiralty jurisdiction over Eaton's claim against Campbell. And
since the district court had admiralty jurisdiction, Campbell's claim to a
jury trial was properly denied. 97
The Watz court did not directly attack the logic of McCann, but left open
the question as to how the ,Fifth Circuit would rule on the issue should it
be squarely presented. The Watz opinion, however, can be read as indi-
cating that the extension of ancillary jurisdiction over a non-maritime third-
party claim might be accomplished by distinguishing McCann on the basis
that the third-party claim there was entirely separate from the plaintiff's
admiralty claim.
The issue was discussed in dictum by the Second Circuit in Leather's Best,
Inc. v. S.S. Mormaclynx,9 8 where the court took note of the pre-unification
cases but stated that the effect of the merger upon the former admiralty re-
quirement of independent admiralty jurisdiction for impleader had not yet
been conclusively decided.99 Although Leather's Best dealt with the issue
of pendent jurisdiction, the Second Circuit regarded ancillary jurisdiction as
relevant to the issue of pendent jurisdiction and stated that the merger of
the civil and admiralty rules and the addition of rule 14(c) to the federal
rules indicate that the rationale which underlies the doctrine of ancillary juris-
diction in the context of civil impleader should also be applicable in admi-
ralty.100 In a footnote to the opinion the court stated:
94. Id. at 117.
95. Id. at 117-18.
96. Id. at 117.
97. Id. at 118; see 7A MooRE .54[3], at 396 n.13 (Supp. 1973).
98. 451 F.2d 800 (2d Cir. 1971).
99. Id. at 810 n.12.
100. Id. In Leather's Best the plaintiff sued the vessel, her owner, and the terminal
operator in connection with the theft of a container of leather from the shipping termi-
nal. Admiralty jurisdiction was properly invoked against the ship and the shipowner,
and the court brought the claim against the terminal operator in under a pendent juris-
diction theory. The Second Circuit argued that the constitutionally accepted doctrine
of ancillary jurisdiction with respect to rule 14 was also applicable in admiralty due to
the 1966 unification, and that by analogy, pendent jurisdiction could also be applied. Id.
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[I]f we were presented with the question, it would only be with the
greatest reluctance that we would conclude that under the merged rules
the doctrine of ancillary jurisdiction did not extend to admiralty as well
as to civil impleader. . . . Certainly the practical considerations which
support the doctrine of ancillary jurisdiction in the context of civil im-
pleader are equally persuasive on the admiralty side. 101
In Leather's Best constitutional considerations thought to limit ancillary juris-
diction in admiralty were regarded as founded solely on the possible denial
of jury trial, an issue not raised in the case.' 0 2
The Second Circuit did not explain how unification made ancillary jurisdic-
tion applicable to admiralty cases' 03 and made no attempt to deal with the
logic expressed in McCann. In Leather's Best the rule 82 prohibition of
expansion of jurisdiction by construction of the rules was ignored. The Sec-
ond Circuit also failed to deal with the jury trial problem, and the question
cannot be resolved merely by stating that the issue need not be considered.' 0 4
Even if it is assumed that there may be some basis in a given case for dis-
tinguishing McCann,'05 the argument set forth therein is persuasive and must
be dealt with in a straightforward manner if the traditional rule rejecting an-
cillary jurisdiction over non-maritime third-party claims in admiralty suits is
to be abandoned. It is apparent that McCann is still the most authoritative
case on the post-unification rules pertaining to ancillary jurisdiction with
respect to admiralty impleader. In fact, the arguments challenging the
McCann decision proved unpersuasive to Judge Noel, and, when again con-
fronted with the issue, he reiterated his position. 10 6 Further support of the
McCann holding is found in Bernard v. United States Lines, Inc.,'07 where
it was held that rule 14(c) "does not create admiralty jurisdiction. Rule 82
expressly negates the extension of jurisdiction by the rules."' 08
Nevertheless, it is submitted that this result is undesirable. The policy of
the federal rules is to permit impleader in any case in which the same trans-
action or occurrence gives rise to the claim.' 09 This policy should not be
defeated merely because the claim is maritime in nature. The following
problem is thus posed: Is there a way to reach an alternative result which
permits the extension of ancillary jurisdiction over non-maritime third-party
at 810-11. The argument as to the relevance of ancillary jurisdiction vis-h-vis pendentjurisdiction is not in doubt. See United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715 (1966),
and as to the exercise of pendent jurisdiction over admiralty claims in a case arising
on the law side, see Romero v. International Terminal Operating Co., 358 U.S. 354
(1959), a pre-unification decision. However, the court's conclusion that unification has
extended ancillary jurisdiction to admiralty suits is subject to challenge. See FED. R.
Civ. P. 82, which forbids expansion of jurisdiction based on construction of the Rules.
See generally Landers, supra note 12, at 69-75.
101. 451 F.2d at 810 n.12.
102. Id. at 811 n.12.
103. Some of the Notes of the Advisory Committee on the 1966 Amendments can
be read to allow ancillary jurisdiction in admiralty cases. See notes 113, 114 intra.
104. Landers, supra note 12, at 75.
105. See Watz v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 431 F.2d 100 (5th Cir. 1970).
106. Stinson v. S.S. Kenneth McKay, 360 F. Supp. 674 (S.D. Tex. 1973).
107. 475 F.2d 1134 (4th Cir. 1973).
108. Id. at 1136.
109. 6 Wuor & MILLER § 1465, at 349 n.26. See also WRIGHT § 76, at 333.
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claims in admiralty suits, and, at the same time, meets and overcomes the
arguments to the contrary set forth in McCann?
III. A PROPOSED SOLUTION TO THE MCCANN DILEMMA
It cannot be doubted that unification of admiralty and civil procedure and
the addition of rule 14(c) to the federal rules in and of themselves create
no new concept of ancillary jurisdiction with respect to third-party practice
in admiralty. 110 It is equally true that Federal Rule 14(c) evolved from
Admiralty Rule 56111 which disallowed the impleading of a non-maritime
third-party claim.112 However, these facts must not necessarily be construed
in such a manner as to bar the extension of ancillary jurisdiction to admiralty
impleader.
A. Construction
As to the initial argument in McCann that rule 14(c) must be deemed
to have emulated the denial of ancillary jurisdiction which was characteristic
of Admiralty Rule 56, the advisory committee stated that unification was in-
tended to "abolish the distinction between civil actions and suits in admi-
ralty." ' 3  There is no indication that there was any intention to retain the
Admiralty Rule 56 prohibition against hearing a non-maritime third-party
claim in an admiralty suit. In fact, the 1966 -note of the advisory committee
on rule 18 suggests a contrary policy: "[F]ree joinder of claims and rem-
edies is one of the basic purposes of the unification of admiralty and civil
procedures.""14 It would follow as a policy argument that ancillary jurisdic-
tion would be an entirely appropriate tool in the promotion of such "free
joinder of claims and remedies." This is given further support when con-
sidered in light of the general policy behind the unification: that is the exten-
sion of modern procedural advantages to actions in admiralty. 115 Thus, it
seems clear that the addition of rule 14(c), while certainly no basis for the
adoption of ancillary jurisdiction in admiralty, cannot be read as impliedly
denying its use.
The conclusion in McCann that the rule 82 prohibition against expansion
of jurisdiction by construction of the rules compels a federal court to follow
the accepted rules of jurisdiction is questionable." 61 It ignores the fact that
ancillary jurisdiction has been extended in civil actions involving impleader
since -the 1938 adoption of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, in spite of
rule 82.117 In this context the argument in favor of the extension of ancillary
jurisdiction to admiralty impleader proceeds on two theories.
110. See generally Landers, note 12 supra; 6 WRIGHT & MILLER § 1465, at 349.
111. See note 10 supra.
112. See note 6 supra.
113. Note of the Advisory Committee on the 1966 Amendment to Rule 1, 28 U.S.C.
APPENDIX-Rules of Civil Procedure 7734 (1970).
114. Id., Rule 18, at 7757-58.
115. See Colby, note 9 supra, at 1258-59. See also Note of the Advisory Committee
on the 1966 Amendment to Rule 1, supra note 113.
116. McCann v. Falgout Boat Co., 44 F.R.D. 34, 41 (S.D. Tex. 1968).
117. Dery v. Wyer, 265 F.2d 804 (2d Cir. 1959); Brandt v. Olson, 179 F. Supp. 363
(N.D. Iowa 1959). See generally 6 WRIGHT & MILLER § 1465, at 349.
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Application of ancillary jurisdiction to admiralty impleader in spite of rule
82 is analogous to the extension of ancillary jurisdiction with respect to civil
impleader. One -theory on which the expansion of ancillary jurisdiction was
based in civil impleader actions is the concept that rule 14 does not actually
extend jurisdiction, but merely sanctions impleader as a procedure resting on
the concept that a "claim" consists of a core of facts "giving rise to rights flow-
ing both to and from a defendant." 118  It would seem, given the policy of
impleader to "avoid circuity of action and to dispose of the entire subject
matter arising from one set of facts in one action,""" -that a federal court
sitting in admiralty would be free to follow the reasoning used in civil im-
pleader for the adoption of ancillary jurisdiction.
The objection to this line of reasoning is that civil courts initially avoided
rule 82 by finding pre-1938 authority sanctioning ancillary jurisdiction in civil
impleader actions, 120 while -no such pre-1938 authority exists with respect to
admiralty impleader. 2  However, in the analysis set forth above, the justi-
fication for avoiding rule 82 in civil actions was not based solely on pre-1938
case law, but rather rested primarily on the theory that the concept of a
"claim" sanctions the exercise of ancillary jurisdiction over third-party actions
growing out of the same transaction or occurrence. Moreover, prior to -unifi-
cation in 1966 it had been held that there may be jurisdiction over a mari-
time suit based on the pendent relationship between the maritime claim and
the civil action properly before the court.122 Given the relationship between
pendent and ancillary jurisdiction, 123 this would seem to support the policy
argument for extension of ancillary jurisdiction over non-maritime third-
party claims in an admiralty suit. Of course, in all cases under rule 14(c)
the third-party claim must necessarily arise from the same transaction or
occurrence or series of transactions or occurrences as the original claim.' 24
Secondly, rule 82 does not say that new concepts of jurisdiction may not
be developed by federal courts, but merely states -that the "rules shall not
be construed to extend . . .jurisdiction."'125  There is nothing in the federal
rules which prohibits admiralty as a body of law, or the federal courts gen-
erally, from adopting new concepts in order to keep pace with the ever-
changing needs which judicial procedure must serve. 126 Thus, federal courts
118. Dery v. Wyer, 265 F.2d 804, 808 (2d Cir. 1959).
119. WRIGHT § 76, at 333.
120. See Brandt v. Olson, 179 F. Supp. 363 (N.D. Iowa 1959); Landers, note 12 su-
pra.
121. See note 6 supra.
122. Romero v. International Terminal Operating Co., 358 U.S. 354 (1959). This
case arose on the law side and the admiralty claim was pendented to the legal claim.
However, the underlying policy reasons should be equally applicable to the reverse situa-
tion in which the main cause lies in admiralty.
123. United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 15 (1966); see notes 49, 100 supra.
124. FED. R. Civ. P. 14(c).
125. FED. R. Civ. P. 82 (emphasis added).
126. The original adoption of impleader in admiralty was the result of judicial deci-
sion. See The Hudson, 15 F. 162 (S.D.N.Y. 1883). It was based on the same policy
grounds later used in support of civil impleader under the Federal Rules. See WIGr
§ 76, at 332-38. As The Hudson demonstrates, there is precedent for expansion of legal
theories in admiralty. Given that the original policies behind civil impleader are the
same as those behind admiralty impleader, it follows that if ancillary jurisdiction helps
carry out these policies in the context of civil impleader, the same would be true foi
actions in admiralty.
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should be free to develop concepts of ancillary jurisdiction with respect to
third-party practice in admiralty as long as the rationale for the development
is not dependent on construction of the federal rules. Under the foregoing
analysis, when the original claim is properly designated as one in admiralty
under rule 9(h) and the case is cognizable in admiralty, a defendant should
be permitted to implead a third party under rule 14(c) if the third-party
claim arises out of the same transaction or occurrence as the original claim,
without regard for the maritime nature of the third-party claim.
B. The Jury Trial Problem
Once over this initial hurdle, the additional problem of the possible denial
of the third-party defendant's right of jury trial still exists. 127 This impedi-
ment is not as serious as some have perceived it to be.'12  It is true that
there is -no right of jury trial in admiralty, 129 and that rule 38(e) states that
"these rules shall not be construed to create a right to trial by jury of the
issues in a maritime claim within the meaning of Rule 9(h)."'130 In McCann
this was construed to mean that if a third party is impleaded under rule
14(c), the third party has no right to a jury trial "either on the issues raised
in the third-party complaint [or] on those he raises by way of his answer."' 81
Such a construction poses serious constitutional questions as to the permis-
sibility of ancillary jurisdiction in admiralty impleader cases; and construc-
tions of the rules which raise constitutional questions should be avoided if
possible. 3 2 The reasoning of the McCann court seems to be in conflict with
the policy stated by the Supreme Court in Beacon Theatres, Inc. v. West-
over.'13  'In Beacon Theatres the Court held that the legal issues raised by
a counterclaim must be tried before a jury in order to preserve the defend-
ant's right of jury trial even though the original suit was for equitable relief.
Under this rationale, an admiralty court could not deprive a third-party de-
fendant of his right of jury trial merely because the original suit was in ad-
miralty. In McCann there was no reason why a jury could not have been
empaneled to hear the legal issues raised by the third-party complaint.' 34
The McCann construction of rule 38(e) seems unreasonable in light of the
fact that a right to a jury trial in an action containing both maritime and
non-maritime claims had been held to exist prior to the 1966 unification. In
Fitzgerald v. United States Lines Co.'35 the Court held that neither the sev-
127. See notes 41-48 supra, and accompanying text.
128. See, e.g., Stinson v. S.S. Kenneth McKay, 360 F. Supp. 674 (S.D. Tex. 1973);
McCann v. Falgout Boat Co., 44 F.R.D. 34 (S.D. Tex. 1968); Landers, note 12 supra.
129. See note 41 supra and accompanying text.
130. FED. R. Civ. P. 38(e).
131. McCann v. Falgout Boat Co., 44 F.R.D. 34, 44 (S.D. Tex. 1968).
132. See note 91 supra.
133. 359 U.S. 500 (1959). See also Dairy Queen v. Wood, 369 U.S. 469 (1962).
134. Further support for this view is found in the fact that jury trials have been al-
lowed under statutory authority in maritime cases arising on the Great Lakes since 1845.
See 28 U.S.C. § 1873 (1974). This practice has been held to be constitutional. The
Genesee Chief v. Fitzhugh, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 443 (1851). See also note 46 supra.
135. 374 U.S. 16 (1963). This was a case where admiralty and nonadmiralty claims
were pendented together. A seaman was permitted to bring a civil action under the
Jones Act for negligence, an action at law, and attach to that his admiralty claims for
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enth amendment nor any other constitutional provision forbids jury trials in
admiralty cases.
The objection to the use of such a splith4rial device is that a part-jury trial
may be unduly cumbersome. It may be argued, theoretically, that liberal
rules of joinder and impleader in conjunction with expanded provisions allow-
ing ancillary jurisdiction may work in many cases to complicate the litigation
unduly, while refusal to hear all the peripheral claims may lead to a quicker
and "better" decision in the main action. An extension of this view is that
denial of ancillary jurisdiction may further work to promote settlement of
potential claims which could conceivably have been included in the law-
suit.
13 6
Nevertheless, 'the objections to the split-trial device are somewhat specula-
tive. It is submitted that it would be proper to extend the doctrine of ancil-
lary jurisdiction to admiralty impleader, thus giving a federal court the power
to hear all the issues arising out of the same transaction or occurrence. The
general thrust of the federal rules has been towards avoiding a multiplicity
of suits based on the same facts,' 3 7 and frustration of these policy considera-
tions need not be compelled by either the reasoning in McCann or the fear
of overly cumbersome litigation. There are several ways by which a federal
court may avoid unnecessarily complicating the main action. A federal court
has the power under rule 14(a) to strike or sever a third-party claim for
separate trial.138  Separate trials may also be ordered under rule 42(b)
"when separate trials will be conducive to expedition and economy" or to
avoid any prejudice which may result from hearing the entire action in one
suit.' 39 The extension of ancillary jurisdiction to admiralty impleader in con-
junction with the option to sever gives a federal court (1) the ability to hear
all claims which should, in the interest of judicial economy and fairness, be
heard in one action, and (2) the flexibility to order separate trials when im-
pleader would not serve economy and fairness.
IV. CONCLUSION
Ancillary jurisdiction over non-maritime third-party claims in admiralty
was not allowed prior to the 1966 procedural unification. 140  The merger of
admiralty and civil procedure cannot be read as automatically extending the
civil concept of ancillary jurisdiction into admiralty impleader. Yet, the uni-
fication seems to indicate that the policies which underlie the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure should be equally applicable to both maritime and non-
maintenance and cure, and unseaworthiness, and have all issues decided by a jury. See
notes 41, 46 supra and accompanying text.
136. For a related discussion see IB MooRE .412[l], at 1809-12 (1974), where
it is asserted that the abandonment of the doctrine of mutuality of estoppel might actu-
ally work to increase litigation without justification.
137. See generally WRIGr § 76, at 333; 6 WRuIr & MILLER § 1014.
138. FED. R. Civ. P. 14(a); see Williams v. United States, 42 F.R.D. 609 (S.D.N.Y.
1967).
139. FED. R. Civ. P. 42(b); see Lankford v. Ryder Truck System, Inc., 41 F.R.D.
430 (D.S.C. 1967); Caplen v. Sturge, 35 F.R.D. 176 (E.D. Pa. 1964).
140. See note 6 supra.
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maritime cases. 141 Thus, given the policy goals, there is no reason why admi-
ralty law should not be free to develop the concept of ancillary jurisdiction
with respect to third-party practice just as the civil courts have done. The
proscription against expansion of jurisdiction contained in rule 82 can be
avoided by following reasoning analogous to that used by the civil courts,'142
or by simply not relying on construction of the rules as the basis for the ex-
pansion. The general policy of judicial economy which underlies impleader
could be enough to set aside the anachronistic rule that a third-party claim
in admiralty must have an independent basis of maritime jurisdiction. 14
The third-party defendant's right of jury trial can be preserved because
there is no constitutional right to a non-jury trial in admiralty.14 4  Legal is-
sues raised by way of a third-party claim can be tried to a jury. Undue com-
plication of lawsuits, and abuse of impleader can be avoided by the use of
such devices as severance and separate trials.' 45  It therefore seems reason-
able that a federal court could properly conclude that a non-maritime third-
party claim arising out of the same transaction or occurrence or series of
transactions or occurrences as the original admiralty claim could be within
the ancillary jurisdiction of the court.
141. See note 126 supra and accompanying text.
142. See notes 118, 119 supra and accompanying text.
143. The advent of admiralty impleader was based on the same grounds as those
which eventually led to civil impleader. See The Hudson, 15 F. 162 (S.D.N.Y. 1883).
These policy grounds caused one early court to extend the doctrine of ancillary jurisdic-
tion to third-party practice in admiralty. See Evans v. New York & Pac. S.S. Co., 163
F. 405 (S.D.N.Y. 1906). See also notes 21, 62, 126 supra.
144. See note 41 supra.
145. See notes 138, 139 supra and accompanying text. It is submitted that it is pref-
erable to give a federal court the power to exercise ancillary jurisdiction over non-mari-
time third-party claims, along with the flexibility of the severance option, rather than
to deny ancillary jurisdiction altogether. This would give a federal court sitting in ad-
miralty the ability to hear all claims arising out of the same transaction or occurrence
which should, in the interest of judicial efficiency and fairness, be heard in one action.
At the same time, the severance option provides the court with a means of avoiding
overly complex litigation which would not serve judicial economy.
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